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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-PENDING PETITION FOR AGENCY
RECONSIDERATION BARS APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
West Penn Power Co. v. EPA (1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
In West Penn Power Co. v. EPA,' West Penn Power Company peti-
tioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to re-
view the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) denial of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's request to redesignate a Western
Pennsylvania county to "attainment" status under the Clean Air Act.
2
West Penn had previously filed a petition for reconsideration of the
agency action.3 That petition was still pending before EPA when West
Penn sought judicial review of EPA's denial.4 Though both West Penn
and EPA claimed that the outstanding petition for agency reconsidera-
tion did not affect appellate jurisdiction, the Third Circuit held that the
pending request for agency reconsideration rendered the original
agency order "non-final," and thus precluded jurisdiction.5 Prompted
by a recent Supreme Court decision, ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers,6 and by concerns for judicial efficiency, 7 the Third Circuit adopted
a definition of "finality" with regard to agency actions which runs
counter to the plain language of the applicable section of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA). 8 This holding has added to the current
1. 860 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1988).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A particular air quality
region reaches "attainment" status when the region complies with national am-
bient air quality standards (NAAQS), which are promulgated by EPA pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 7409. See West Penn, 860 F.2d at 583.
3. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 582.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 583.
6. 482 U.S. 270 (1987).
7. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 586-87.
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 704 is entitled
"Actions reviewable" and provides in full:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to
judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency ac-
tion or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review
of the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by
statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this
section whether or not there has been presented or determined an ap-
plication for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or,
unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the ac-
tion meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency
authority.
Id. § 704.
(517)
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split among the circuits on this issue. 9
II. DISCUSSION
West Penn is an electric utility that operates a coal-fired generating
station in Armstrong County, Pennsylvania." ° West Penn built an ex-
traordinarily tall smokestack to disperse pollutants and to improve local
air quality.' I The stack conformed to, and was built in reliance on, pro-
posed EPA regulations.1 2 EPA, however, eventually promulgated final
regulations that were significantly more stringent than those proposed
at the time West Penn constructed its smokestack. 13 Under the final
regulations the stack height exceeded "good engineering practice.' 4
Therefore, the dispersive effect of the height of the stack did not provide
9. See, e.g., Northside Sanitary Landfill v. Thomas, 804 F.2d 371 (7th Cir.
1986) (allowed simultaneous agency and court jurisdiction); American Trucking
Ass'ns v. ICC, 697 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same); cf. Tenneco Oil v. Depart-
ment of Energy, 475 F. Supp. 299, 315-16 (D. Del. 1979) (allowed simultaneous
agency and court jurisdiction, but dismissed claim not raised in optional agency
reconsideration mechanism).
10. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 583.
11. Id. The 307-meter smokestack, built to replace two 70-meter stacks,
reduced pollution in the local area because its extraordinary height ensures that
high wind currents catch the smoke generated and send pollutants elsewhere.
Id. This type of dispersion technique "is generally regarded as the cause of 'acid
rain.' " Id. In 1977, Congress expressed its preference for pollution reduction
over pollution dispersion by adding § 123 to the Clean Air Act. Id. Section 123
provides in part:
The degree of emission limitation required for control of any air
pollutant under an applicable implementation plan under this sub-
chapter shall not be affected in any manner by-(l) so much of the
stack height of any source as exceeds good engineering practice (as de-
termined under regulations promulgated by the Administrator), or
(2) any other dispersion technique.
42 U.S.C. § 7423(a) (1982).
12. Vest Penn, 860 F.2d at 583. The stack conformed to proposed regula-
tions promulgated by EPA pursuant to § 123 of the Clean Air Act onJanuary 12,
1979. Id. Pennsylvania included West Penn's construction of the Armstrong
stack in the 1981 revision of its state implementation plan (SIP), "a statutorily
required roadmap for achieving and maintaining air quality attainment status in
each of a state's air quality regions." Id. EPA approved the SIP, indicating its
belief that the "stack would allow Armstrong County to attain national ambient
air quality standards." Id.
13. Id. at 583-84. In 1982, EPA promulgated final regulations much less
stringent than those proposed in 1979, but these 1982 rules were invalidated in
Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S.
1204 (1984). In 1985, as a result of Sierra Clnb, the EPA promulgated considera-
bly more stringent regulations. W1est Penn, 860 F.2d at 583-84.
14. WVest Penn, 860 F.2d at 584. According to § 123 of the Clean Air Act, if
the height of a stack exceeds "good engineering practice" (GEP), that source of
pollution receives no credit for improvements in local air quality achieved fiom
any dispersive effect. Id. at 583. For the text of § 123, see supra note 11.
Applying the 1985 regulations, the Armstrong stack exceeded GEP height.
fiest Penn, 860 F.2d at 584.
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any pollution reduction credit for the area.15 Without this pollution re-
duction credit, the entire Armstrong County air quality region was no
longer in attainment status.16
Pennsylvania requested that EPA redesignate the county to attain-
ment status, 1 7 but EPA denied the request.' 8 West Penn then filed a
petition for reconsideration with EPA.' 9 In the meantime, West Penn
petitioned the Third Circuit for review of the original EPA order while
the reconsideration petition was still pending. 20 The court was unaware
of the pending reconsideration petition until some months after oral ar-
guments had been held on the case.21 The court raised the question of
jurisdiction sua sponte, recognizing "an independent duty to examine [its]
jurisdiction. ' '2 2 The court found it did not have jurisdiction and, there-
fore, dismissed the action. 23
* The issue facing the Third Circuit was whether a court of appeals
can exercise jurisdiction when the party seeking judicial review of an
agency order has filed a pending petition for agency reconsideration of
the order. The Third Circuit began by examining the statutory basis for
appellate jurisdiction of an EPA order. 24 The court acknowledged that,
had West Penn not filed the petition for reconsideration, EPA's refusal
to redesignate Armstrong County to attainment status would have been
a "final action" when it was issued. 2 5 Therefore, the action would have
been judicially reviewable. 2 6 The court considered whether a timely pe-
15. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 584.
16. Id.
17. Id. The state insisted that EPA " 'honor its previous commitment'
under the 1979 regulations and 1981 SIP approval." Id.
18. Id. EPA denied Pennsylvania's reclassification request primarily due to
lack of any evidence that the Armstrong stack conformed to the 1985 stack
height regulations. Id.
19. Id. West Penn argued that it relied on EPA's 1981 SIP approval and
constructed the $13 million stack solely to comply with the Clean Air Act. Id. at
584 n.2. West Penn termed EPA's SIP approval "an 'ad hoc rule,' which, it sub-
mits, cannot be retroactively displaced." Id.
20. Id. at 584.
2 1. Id. at 582. West Penn indicated that it had sought agency reconsidera-
tion in a footnote to a supplemental letter-brief addressing the merits of its
claim. Id. The Third Circuit realized that this might preclude its jurisdiction
and solicited memoranda from the parties addressing the jurisdiction issue. Id.
22. Id. (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534
(1986)). Both parties argued that the petition for agency reconsideration did
not vitiate appellate jurisdiction. Id.
23. Id. at 588.
24. Id. at 584. The court's jurisdiction derives from § 307(b)(1) of the
Clean Air Act. That section provides in pertinent part: "A petition for review of
... any other final action of the Administrator under this chapter . . . which is
locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the appropriate circuit." 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982).
25. l/est Pem, 860 F.2d at 584.
26. For the full text of § 704, see supra note 8.
19891 519
3
Pascale: Administrative Law - Pending Petition for Agency Reconsideration
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tition for agency reconsideration renders the original action non-final. 27
This issue has divided the courts of appeals ever since enactment of the
APA. 28 If the agency action is rendered non-final, then the court of ap-
peals has no jurisdiction over the action. 29 If, on the other hand, the
agency action is final, regardless of whether a timely reconsideration pe-
tition has been filed, then a party may request simultaneous agency re-
consideration and judicial review.3 0
To examine this issue, the court first considered the APA's general
definition of "finality."'' l Section 704 states that "agency action other-
wise final is final for the purposes of [judicial review] whether or not there
has been presented or determined an application for . . . any form of reconsidera-
tion." 32 If, as the statute provides, an agency action is final whether or
not a party has presented a reconsideration application, then a pending
petition for reconsideration should not render the original agency ac-
tion non-final.3 3 The court noted that District of Columbia Circuit
Judge (nowJustice) Scalia had asserted in American Trucking Associations v.
ICC3 4 that "[t]he Administrative Procedure Act explicitly permits judi-
cial appeal and request for agency reconsideration to be pursued
simultaneously." 3 5
The court found that, prior to passage of the APA, it was well-ac-
cepted that a pending reconsideration petition defeated appellate juris-
diction.3 6 After the enactment of the APA, a split arose among the
circuits concerning the effect of section 704 of the APA on this body of
prior case law.3 7 Consequently, the Third Circuit in West Penn examined
27. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 584.
28. Id. at 582-83 (citing Northside Sanitary Landfill v. Thomas, 804 F.2d
371 (7th Cir. 1986) (allowing simultaneous agency and court jurisdiction);
American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 697 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same); Win-
ter v. ICC, 697 F.2d 1056 (8th Cir.) (not allowing simultaneous jurisdiction), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 308 (1988)).
29. Id. at 584 (citing ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S.
270, 284-85 (1987)).
30. Id.
31. Id. As the court stated, "[i]t makes sense to define 'finality' under the
Clean Air Act in the same way that it is defined in administrative law generally.
The APA provides a general definition of administrative finality." Id.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added). For the full
text of § 704, see supra note 8.
33. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 584. The court terms this a "facially correct in-
terpretation of section 704" because the statute appears plain on its face. Id.
34. 697 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1983). For a discussion of the facts of American
Trucking, see infra note 39.
35. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 584 (quoting American Trucking, 697 F.2d at 1148
n. *).
36. Id. at 585 (citing Southland Indus. v. FCC, 99 F.2d 117, 120 (D.C. Cir.
1938), as exemplifying prior practice). The court noted that there is no evi-
dence that Congress enacted § 704 in order to alter this prior practice. Id.
37. See id. at 584-85. For a discussion of these two opposing lines of cases,
see infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
520 [Vol. 34: p. 517
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these two opposing lines of cases.
Some courts, such as the Seventh Circuit3 8 and the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit,3 9 have allowed simultaneous agency and court jurisdic-
tion. The West Penn court viewed these cases as examples of "uncritical
reliance on [the] plain meaning" of section 704,40 primarily because
those courts of appeals either failed to consider conflicting precedent 41
or employed a line of reasoning too narrow to be useful after the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Locomotive Engineers.
4 2
38. See Northside Sanitary Landfill v. Thomas, 804 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1986).
In Northside, EPA denied a waste disposal facility's application for a hazardous
waste permit. Id. at 376. The facility (Northside) petitioned EPA for review of
the order denying the permit application. Id. This petition was also denied. Id.
Northside then filed a motion to reconsider with EPA. Id. at 377. Northside
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ex-
actly 90 days after EPA's issuance of the original order denying review, but
before EPA had ruled on the subsequent motion to reconsider. Id. at 376-77.
The EPA denied the motion to reconsider some five months later. Id. at 378.
Northside's petition for judicial review was timely under the Solid Waste Dispo-
sal Act, which had a 90-day time limit for appeals. Id. at 378-79 (citation omit-
ted). The court also held that the pending motion to reconsider did not render
the petition for judicial review premature, since § 704 of the APA permits simul-
taneous administrative reconsideration and judicial review. Id.
39. See American Trucking, 697 F.2d 1146. In American Trucking, the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order which effectively exempted some
operators from certain regulatory requirements. Id. at 1148. The petitioners,
associations of carriers adversely affected by the ICC order, appealed for judicial
review within the 60-day statutory time limit. Id. The petitioners subsequently
filed three motions for reconsideration which the ICC rejected in succession. Id.
The court went directly to the merits of petitioners' challenge to the ICC's inter-
pretation of provisions of the Motor Carrier Act. Id. The court noted in a foot-
note that the APA allows simultaneous judicial review and agency
reconsideration. Id. at 1148 n.* (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976)).
40. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 587.
41. Id. (citing Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
In Outland, certain pilots petitioned the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to
challenge an integrated seniority list created incident to an airline merger. Out-
land, 284 F.2d at 225. A CAB order dismissed the petition without a rehearing.
Id. The CAB also denied a subsequent reconsideration petition. Id. The appli-
cable statute provided a 60-day time limit for the filing of a petition for judicial
review. Id. at 227. The pilots filed a petition for judicial review more than 60
days after the original order of dismissal, but within 60 days of the order deny-
ing reconsideration. Id. at 226. The court construed the then-existing version
of § 704 of the APA to provide that "when a motion for rehearing is made, the
time for filing a petition for judicial review does not begin to run until the mo-
tion for rehearing is acted upon by the Board." Id. at 228.
The West Penn court noted that "[ajlthough Outland ... was binding prece-
dent in the D.C. Circuit at the time Judge Scalia wrote American Trucking, he
makes no attempt in American Trucking to reconcile his interpretation of section
704 with the prior contrary interpretation in his circuit." 1l'est Penn, 860 F.2d at
587.
42. 482 U.S. 270 (1987). See West Penn, 860 F.2d at 587 (citing Northside,
804 F.2d at 378). The Seventh Circuit in Northside had "no prior binding prece-
dent interpreting section 704 against its plain meaning," Id. For a discussion of
the facts of Northside, see supra note 38.
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Other courts, notably the Ninth Circuit, 43 have held that filing a
petition for reconsideration renders the prior agency action non-final.
These cases have defined agency finality in order to determine when the
time limit for an appeal will expire. 44 The timeliness of an appeal might
depend on whether the filing of a reconsideration petition deprived the
prior agency decision of finality, because the time limit for appeal begins
to run once the agency decision is final. 4 5 Therefore, if the statutorily
prescribed time limit passes while a party awaits the outcome of agency
reconsideration, the status of the prior agency decision during the pen-
dency of the reconsideration petition is crucial. The party cannot appeal
for judicial review after unfavorable disposition of the reconsideration
petition unless the filing of the reconsideration petition rendered the
prior agency action non-final and thus tolled the running of the limita-
tions period. 4 6
On the other hand, if the agency rules on the reconsideration peti-
tion before the time limit for appeal elapses, and the party then
promptly files a petition for judicial review, the limitations question is
moot.4 7 In order to avoid this problem, these circuits have held that the
43. Samuel B. Franklin & Co. v. SEC, 290 F.2d 719 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 888 (1961). In Samuel B. Franklin, a securities dealer was censured and
fined by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) for a viola-
tion of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice. Id. at 721. The Board of Governors
of the NASD upheld this action. Id. The petitioner appealed to the SEC to set
aside the Board of Governors' decision. Id. at 722. The SEC dismissed this
application for review. Id. The petitioner's subsequent application for rehear-
ing was also denied. Id. The petitioner then sought judicial review from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id. The petition for judi-
cial review was filed 86 days after the SEC denied the application for review, but
only 59 days after the SEC denied the application for rehearing. Id. The appli-
cable agency statute provided a 60-day time limit for filing a petition for judicial
review of an SEC order. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the prior interpretation
of § 704 of the APA it had established in Consolidated Flower Shipments, Inc. v.
CAB, 205 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1953). Samuel B. Franklin, 290 F.2d at 725. The
court followed the District of Columbia's decision in Outland and found that the
appeal was timely since "the timely filing of a petition for agency reconsideration
does toll the sixty-day period for appeal to this court." Id.
44. See Outland, 284 F.2d at 226. See also Arch Mineral Corp. v. Office of
Workers' Comp., 798 F.2d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1986); Tiger Int'l, Inc. v. CAB, 554
F.2d 926, 931 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); B.J. McAdams,
Inc. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 1112, 1115 (8th Cir. 1977); Tallman v. Udall, 324 F.2d
411, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1963), rev'd on other ground, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Montship
Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
45. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1982) (sets 60-day time limit for appeal from
entry of final order of ICC).
46. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 584-85 (citing City of Newark v. FERC, 763 F.2d
533 (3d Cir. 1985); Outland, 284 F.2d 224). For a discussion of the facts in Out-
land, see supra note 41. In CitV of iVewark, the Third Circuit interpreted the Fed-
eral Power Act to mandate a tolling of the time limit for appeal when a timely
reconsideration petition is before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
City of Newark, 763 F.2d at 545.
47. Some statutes provide a time limit within which the administrative
agency must rule on the motion for rehearing or reconsideration. See, e.g-., Nati-
[Vol. 34: p. 517
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petition for reconsideration vitiated the finality of the agency action. 48
The Third Circuit in West Penn recognized that this line of cases basically
applied pre-APA law, "[nlotwithstanding the language of section
704." 4 9 The Third Circuit found additional support for this view in the
legislative history of section 704,50 which offered "no evidence that
Congress intended to alter the prior practice" that a pending petition
for agency reconsideration precludes judicial review and tolls the limita-
tions period.5 1
Above all, the West Penn court analyzed the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Locomotive Engineers,5 2 which unequivocally interpreted sec-
tion 704 against its plain meaning.5 3 Locomotive Engineers, like the influ-
ential District of Columbia Circuit case Outland v. CAB, 54 held that a
pending reconsideration petition renders an agency decision non-final
ral Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) (1982) ("Unless the Commission acts upon the
application for rehearing within thirty days after it is filed, such application may
be deemed to have been denied."); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(a)
(1982) (same).
48. For examples of these cases, see supra note 44.
49. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 584.
50. Id. at 585 (citing Comment, "Final" Orders: Section 10(c) of the APA, 6
STAN. L. REV. 531 (1954)).
51. Id.
52. 482 U.S. 270 (1987). In Locomotive Engineers, the ICC issued an order
which gave two railroads the right to use the tracks of a newly consolidated car-
rier. Id. at 274. A union filed a "Petition for Clarification," seeking a declara-
tion that the order did not authorize the railroads to use their own crews on the
new routes. Id. at 275. The ICC denied the petition, explaining that since the
railroads' trackage rights applications had proposed they use their own crews,
the ICC's approval order authorized such operations and no clarification was
required. Id. at 275-76. The union next filed a petition for reconsideration,
contending that the railroads' crewing procedures violated applicable labor stat-
utes. Id. at 276. The ICC denied the petition. Id. Shortly thereafter, the union
petitioned for judicial review. Id. Although the petition for review was filed
more than 60 days after the ICC issued the order denying the Petition for Clari-
fication, the Court held it was timely because the petition for reconsideration
stayed the running of the limitations period until the ICC ruled on it. Id. at 285.
However, the Court held that the ICC's refusal to reopen the proceeding, in the
absence of some allegation of new evidence or changed circumstances, was an
agency action "committed to agency discretion by law" and was therefore not
reviewable. Id. at 282 (quoting APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). The Court stated
that the union should have filed a timely appeal from the original order many
months earlier. Id. at 286.
53. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 587. The Court in Locomotive Engineers actually
construed the language of the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1982), which gov-
erns judicial review of final orders of the ICC, and the Revised Interstate Com-
merce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10327(i) (1982), but based its analysis on § 704 of the
APA, "a similar provision." Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 284. The Court found
"no basis for distinguishing the language of § 10327(i) from that of § 704." Id.
at 285.
54. 284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1960). For a discussion of the facts of Outland,
see supra note 41. For a list of cases which have followed Outland, see supra note
44.
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for purposes of tolling the running of a time limit for appeal. 5 5 These
cases arose in a different factual context from West Penn, which sought to
define finality for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction.16 Although the
West Penn court eventually found Locomotive Engineers dispositive, it con-
sidered two grounds upon which it could be distinguished from West
Penn .57
First the court noted that the Supreme Court in Locomotive Engineers
was concerned with parties filing needless appeals. If the law of the rele-
vant circuit was that the timely filing of a reconsideration petition did
not stay the appeals period, litigants would file "protective appeals" to
avoid losing all opportunity forjudicial review.5 8 This would arise when
the statutory time limit for appeal neared expiration before the agency
disposed of the reconsideration petition. 59 In a simultaneous jurisdic-
tion situation, by contrast, a party has chosen to petition the court and
the agency at the same time.60 No litigant has been compelled to pass
through the procedural hoop of filing an appeal to ensure the ultimate
availability of the court of appeals. Rather, the petitioner has chosen to
pursue remedies in two different forums. Therefore, perhaps finality
could be defined differently in this context. 6 1 The Third Circuit was
unmoved by this distinction, finding "incoherence in defining [finality]
differently for triggering time limits for review and for ...making an
action reviewable. ' '62 The court also supported its conclusion with pol-
icy considerations. It noted that simultaneous agency and court jurisdic-
tion could represent a waste of judicial resources because the outcome
of agency reconsideration might render all interim judicial efforts
superfluous.
63
The second basis the West Penn court posited for distinguishing Lo-
comotive Engineers was the treatment of finality in the multi-party context.
The court observed that it is not unusual for a single agency action to be
55. Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 284-85.
56. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 582.
57. Id. at 586. Both EPA and West Penn argued that the outstanding peti-
tion for reconsideration had no effect on the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 582. The
court termed the parties' submissions "essentially conclusory." Id. at 586. The
court therefore formulated its own arguments against its position. Id.
58. Id. at 585 (citing Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 284-85 (citing Outland,
284 F.2d at 227)).
59. See, e.g., Northside Sanitary Landfill v. Thomas, 804 F.2d 371, 376-77
(7th Cir. 1986). EPA had not yet ruled on Northside's motion to reconsider as
the 90-day time limit for appeal approached, so Northside filed for judicial re-
view. Id. For a discussion of the facts of Northside, see supra note 38.
60. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 586.
61. Id. at 585, 586.
62. Id. at 586. As the court stated, "[t]he reason that the time limit for
appeal begins to run when a final judgment is entered is precisely that once the
final judgment is entered the petitioner has the opportunity to bring its case to
the Court of Appeals." Id. at 585-86.
63. Id. at 585 (citing Outland, 284 F.2d at 227).
524 [Vol. 34: p. 517
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considered final for one party and non-final for another.6 4 If a single
agency action affects more than one party, one party may petition for
review from the final agency action and another may request administra-
tive reconsideration which renders the original agency action non-fi-
nal. 65 The West Penn court, however, discounted this argument,
explaining that the existence of the multi-party scheme does not mean
that finality is a concept with no precise definition. 66 It only means that
"finality with respect to agency action is a party-based concept." '6 7 A
court can examine a certain party's exact procedural posture and inter-
pret the finality of the agency action accordingly.
In addition, the court perceived good reasons why the possible
waste of resources implicit in simultaneous agency and court jurisdiction
should be tolerated when one party asks for agency reconsideration and
another goes directly to court.68 Congress intended the APA to relieve
parties of the requirement of requesting administrative rehearings
before seeking judicial relief.69 As such, a goal of the statute would be
thwarted if one party could file a reconsideration petition that rendered
the agency action non-final for all other parties. 70 The filing of a recon-
sideration petition renders an agency action non-final with respect to the
filing party, however, and the court saw "no justification for allowing a
petitioner to apply to both the court and the agency at the same time."'7 1
The court examined the circuit court opinions which allowed such
simultaneous jurisdiction, 72 but found that they offered no grounds to
64. Id. at 586-87.
65. Id. at 587 (citing American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397
U.S. 532 (1970)). In American Farm Lines, the ICC granted American Farm Lines
(AFL), a motor carrier, temporary operating authority. American Farm Lines, 397
U.S. at 536. Protesting carriers sought immediate judicial review. Id. A district
court judge issued a temporary restraining order, and the ICC accordingly sus-
pended AFL's operating authority. Id. Several reconsideration petitions were
pending before the ICC when the district court issued the order. Id. The ICC
granted these petitions, reopened the proceeding, and entered a new order
granting AFL temporary operating authority. Id. A judge restrained operation
of this new order. Id. After a full hearing on the merits, the court set aside both
orders. Id. Both AFL and the ICC appealed to the Supreme Court which held
that, as long as the agency's acts do not conflict with the court's jurisdiction,
simultaneous court and agency jurisdiction is permissible in multi-party pro-
ceedings. Id. at 541 (citing Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 160
(1939)). The Court stated that "[i]n multi-party proceedings .. .some may seek
judicial review and others may seek administrative reconsideration." Id. (empha-
sis added).
66. IWest Penn, 860 F.2d at 586.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 585 (citing Locomotive Engrs, 482 U.S. at 284-85).
70. Id. at 587. The court explained that "parties seeking immediate judicial
relief would be forced to wait until the agency disposed of the reconsideration
petitions filed by others." Id.
71. Id. at 586.
72. Id. at 587. These cases were Northside Sanitary Landfill v. Thomas,
19891 525
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distinguish West Penn from Locomotive Engineers.7  The West Penn court
noted that in Winter v. ICC,7 4 decided after Locomotive Engineers, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also found simultaneous jurisdiction
impermissible.
75
With no persuasive authority to the contrary, the West Penn court
concluded that the APA did not embody a congressional intent to sanc-
tion the type of judicial inefficiency concomitant with simultaneous
agency and court review.7 6 In addition, the West Penn court perceived
Locomotive Engineers as the Supreme Court's imprimatur on an interpreta-
tion of section 704 under which the filing of a reconsideration petition
renders the prior agency action non-final. 77 Thus, the West Penn court
looked beyond the plain meaning of section 704 and held that "courts of
appeals cannot have jurisdiction over a petition for review when a peti-
tion for reconsideration brought by the same party is still pending
before the agency."
78
III. ANALYSIS
The West Penn court's analysis started with the fundamental premise
that a federal court will review only a final administrative order. 79 The
804 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1986) and American Trucking Associations v. ICC, 697
F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1983). For a discussion of the facts of Northside and Ameri-
can Trucking, see supra notes 38 and 39, respectively.
73. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 587. In American Trucking, Judge Scalia gave no
explanation for following a "plain language" interpretation of § 704 which con-
flicted with the District of Columbia Circuit's earlier opinion in Outland v. CAB,
284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1960). West Penn, 860 F.2d at 587. The Seventh Circuit
in Northside did not consider the impact of agency "finality" on the running of
the time limit for appeal. Id.
74. 851 F.2d 1056 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 308 (1988).
75. Id. at 1062. In Winter, the ICC granted a railroad an exemption from
certain regulatory requirements pursuant to a trackage rights agreement. Id. at
1059. A union filed a petition to revoke the exemption, but the ICC denied this
petition. Id. at 1059-60. The union then petitioned to reopen the decision. Id.
at 1060. While this petition was still pending, the union sought judicial review.
Id. The court held that the ICC decision denying the petition to revoke was
rendered non-final when the union filed the petition to reopen. Id. at 1062.
Relying upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 704 of the APA in Locomo-
tive Engineers, the court refused to allow simultaneous judicial and administrative
review. Id. at 1061-62. Therefore, it dismissed the petition. Id. at 1064.
76. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 587.
77. Id. at 585.
78. Id. at 587.
79. Agency action is not final, and hence not judicially reviewable, until the
agency has reached a clear and definite statement of its position. See Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967). This finality requirement, a
precondition to appellate jurisdiction, is incorporated in the APA through
§ 704. For the text of § 704, see supra note 8.
Commentators have noted that the language of the APA is less than helpful
in determining when an agency action is final and, therefore, judicially review-
able. See, e.g. Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in .4dministra-
tive Law, 69 MICH. I.. REv. 1443, 1453 (1971) (noting § 704 leaves "finality"
526 [Vol. 34: p. 517
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l1"est Penn problem arises in a factual setting of parties dissatisfied with
agency orders. Each party has a clear idea as to the course of action that
will most effectively protect its interests. 80 A party may want to proceed
directly to court without pursuing optional agency remedies,"' or seek
agency reconsideration while preserving an opportunity for judicial re-
view. 82 An optimal system of administrative procedure would allow par-
ties to proceed according to their self-defined best interests with
minimal waste of administrative and judicial resources. 8 3
A. Exhaustion Under Pre-APA Law
Prior to the APA, petitioners were uncertain whether they were re-
quired to apply for a rehearing in order to exhaust administrative reme-
dies. 84 If the relevant agency statute did not mandate agency
reconsideration but merely indicated that rehearing was available,
courts differed as to whether rehearing was truly optional or was in fact a
prerequisite to judicial review. 85 A party adversely affected by an agency
order might prefer to appeal the order directly to a federal court. How-
ever, the relevant circuit might have indicated in a similar factual context
that agency reconsideration was necessary for judicial review. 86 There-
fore, the party would file a rehearing petition solely because this was a
undefined); Comment, Limiting Judicial Intervention in Ongoing Administrative Pro-
ceedings, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 452, 475 (1980) ("The term 'agency action' is defined
in the APA . . . . 'Finality,' however, finds no similar definition, although it is
ultimately the most critical term.").
80. See Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (§ 704 of the
APA "does not command a motion for rehearing...; it leaves that to each liti-
gant's choice"). See also Fuchs, Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action, 51 IND. L.J. 867, 871 (1976) ("Unless conservation ofjudicial time
was among the reasons for providing [for rehearing or reconsideration], public
policy reasons for requiring [either] as a prerequisite to judicial review are not
strong; the objector to agency action may pbrsue the remedy or not.., without
effect upon his right to judicial review.").
81. See, e.g., American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532,
536 (1970) (protesting carriers sought direct judicial review).
82. See, e.g., Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 276 (union petitioned for judicial
review after agency denied petitions for clarification and reconsideration).
83. See S. Doc. No.- 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1946). According to the
Senate Judiciary Committee Report, "[t]here should be some simple and stan-
dard plan of administrative procedure." Id.
84. See Comment, "Final" Orders: Section 10(c) of the APA, 6 S'FAN. I. REV.
531, 533 (1954) (law prior to APA was unclear on exhaustion of agency
remedies).
85. See, e.g., Southland Indus. v. FCC, 99 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1938)
("Whether a petition for rehearing should be filed ... must be decided on the
merits as each case arises."). See also Levers v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 219, 221-22
(1945) ("[Exhaustion doctrine] does not automatically require that judicial re-
view must always be denied where rehearing is authorized but not sought.").
86. See, e.g., Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir.)
(appeal dismissed for failure to seek available administrative remedies, particu-
larly rehearing), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 625 (1938).
1989] 527
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requirement for the court's jurisdiction. 8 7 The party may not have de-
sired agency reconsideration because it was prejudicial to its case, or
because it felt agency intransigence would make rehearing futile. 88 This
problem of "token" rehearings was effectively eliminated by section
704.89
B. Section 704: Congressional Intent Versus Impact
In formulating section 704, Congress was aware that federal courts
would review only final administrative orders.90 It was perceived as
wasteful to compel litigants to request administrative rehearing unless
they choose to do so or are required by statute.9 1 Therefore, Congress
probably intended that the original agency order should operate as final
for purposes of appellate jurisdiction even if no agency rehearing has
been requested. 92 But while section 704 solved the token rehearing
problem, its plain language created more confusion.9 3 Section 704 led
to uncertainty as to the effect on appellate jurisdiction and the limita-
tions period when a party actually files a rehearing petition. 94
87, See Comment, supra note 84, at 534 (some litigants filed for rehearing
"to insure a day in court").
88. See, e.g., Red River, 98 F.2d at 288 (appellant claimed that had it sought
administrative reconsideration "its request would have been denied").
89, See Fuchs, supra note 80, at 872 ("[Section 704] ... abolishes the need
for resort to administrative appeals which are not made prerequisites by statute
.... [T]his position is contrary to the doctrine of exhaustion as previously un-
derstood .... ").
90. For a discussion of the finality requirement, see supra note 79 and ac-
companying text.
91. See Comment, supra note 84, at 534 (noting wasteful effects of requiring
exhaustion of agency remedies).
The enabling legislation of the administrative agency will take precedence
over the general provisions of § 7P4 of the APA. Therefore, a federal court
might not have jurisdiction over an otherwise final and reviewable agency order.
For examples of statutes that mandate a rehearing, see Natural Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. § 717r(a) (1982) ("No proceeding to review any order of the Commission
shall be brought by any person unless such person shall have made application
to the Commission for a rehearing thereon."); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 8251(a) (1982) (same). Provisions such as these reflect the results of a legisla-
tive cost/benefit analysis. The legislature has determined that it is not wasteful
to require a party to apply for a rehearing prior to seeking judicial review.
92. See S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1946) (legislative history
of APA). See also Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ("The
legislative history of [§ 704] indicates that it was adopted to achieve harmony
with the [Supreme Court's] holding in Levers v. Anderson to the effect that a mo-
tion for rehearing was not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies.") (cita-
tion omitted).
93. For a discussion of the resulting split among the circuit courts, see supra
notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
94. Some post-APA cases have held that a pending reconsideration petition
does not defeat appellate jurisdiction. For a list of these cases, see supra note 9.
Other circuits have held that simultaneous jurisdiction is impermissible. See
Winter v. ICC, 851 F.2d 1056, 1062 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 308 (1988);
528 [Vol. 34: p. 517
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To illustrate, suppose a party adversely affected by an agency action
chooses to seek agency reconsideration. Under a literal interpretation
of section "704, the original agency action is final when issued even
though a reconsideration petition has been filed. 9 5 The petition for re-
consideration might remain pending when the time limit for judicial ap-
peal is about to expire. 9 6 The time limit for appeal will run from the
issuance of the order, and the litigant might well lose all opportunity for
judicial review while awaiting the outcome of agency reconsideration. 9 7
This is a harsh and undesirable outcome.98
One way to mitigate the potential unfairness resulting from a literal
interpretation of section 704 is to read it to allow simultaneous agency
Aeromar, C. Por A. v. Department of Transp., 767 F.2d 1491, 1493 (11 th Cir.
1985); ECEE, Inc. v. FERC, 611 F.2d 554, 557 (5th Cir. 1980).
Similarly, some post-APA cases have held that the filing of a reconsideration
petition tolls the time limit for appeal. For a list of these cases, see supra note 44.
On the other hand, certain circuits have not allowed tolling in that circumstance.
See Selco Supply Co. v. EPA, 632 F.2d 863, 865 (10th Cir. 1980) (relevant stat-
ute requiring prompt resolution of EPA orders did not provide for tolling upon
motion for reconsideration), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Laminators Safety
Glass Ass'n v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 578 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(distinguished Outland; relevant statute did not provide for rehearing or recon-
sideration); Consolidated Flower Shipments v. CAB, 205 F.2d 449, 451 (9th Cir.
1953), overruled by Samuel B. Franklin & Co. v. SEC, 290 F.2d 719, 725 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 888 (1961).
95. For the text-of § 704, see supra note 8.
96. This was the case in Northside Sanitary Landfill v. Thomas, 804 F.2d
371 (7th Cir. 1986). Northside petitioned forjudicial review exactly 90 days (the
statutory limit) after the disputed agency order was issued. Id. at 377. There-
fore, the court did not have to decide whether filing a motion for reconsidera-
tion suspends the time limit for appeal. Id. at 378-79. Had the court found
simultaneous jurisdiction impermissible and dismissed the petition for review as
premature, Northside would probably have sought a ruling that judicial review
would still be available after the agency ruled on the pending petition. That is,
Northside would have contended that the pending petition rendered the prior
agency order non-final for purposes of tolling the time limit for appeal as well as
for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. For the facts of Northside, see supra note
38.
97. This scenario occurred in a post-APA case, Consolidated Flower Ship-
ments v. CAB, 205 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1953). In Consolidated Flower, the appellant
sought judicial review 62 days after the issuance of the original agency order but
only seven days after a rehearing petition was denied. Id. at 450. The statutory
time limit for judicial review of CAB orders was 60 days. Id. The court inter-
preted § 10(c) of the APA, the then-existing version of § 704, according to its
literal meaning and held that the petition was untimely. Id. at 451. Because this
holding changed the law of the circuit, the court found that petitioner had rea-
sonably relied on established law and granted a motion to file the petition after
the 60-day limit. Id. at 452.
98. See Comment, supra note 84, at 536-37 (noting that such interpretation
may force choice between agency and judicial review). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
later reversed itself and adopted the Outland rule that the timely filing of a peti-
tion for reconsideration tolls the time limit for appeal to a federal court. See
Samuel B. Franklin, 290 F.2d 719. For the facts of Samuel B. Franklin, see supra
note 43.
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and court jurisdiction.'! ' This interpretation is merely a further exten-
sion of the "plain language" rationale. Because section 704 states that
an agency order is final whether or not a reconsideration petition has
been filed, a pending reconsideration petition does not deprive the
agency action of finality. An appellate court can exercise jurisdiction
over the final agency order while the agency considers the request for
reconsideration.'" ° Under this interpretation of section 704, a litigant
might request judicial review while its reconsideration petition is pend-
ing solely to avoid the expiration of the time limit for appeal and to
ensure its day in court. However, this is precisely the protective appeal
problem addressed in Locomotive Engineers. 10
C. The West Penn Approach
In holding that such simultaneous jurisdiction is impermissible, the
West Penn opinion is consonant with Locomotive Engineers. Both cases in-
terpreted section 704 against its plain meaning. 10 2 This appears to be
the only approach which solves the token rehearing/protective appeals
problem without creating more inequity and inefficiency.
It is submitted that the Third Circuit in West Penn was correct in
holding that finality should be defined the same for purposes of provid-
ing appellate jurisdiction and for triggering a time limit for appeal. The
court remarked that "there is no principled way to distinguish between"
the two concepts of finality.' 0 3 Yet the West Penn opinion, for the sake of
arguing against dismissing the petition for review, distinguished the
facts before it from those of Locomotive Engineers.10 4 Though the West
Penn holding is in accord with Locomotive Engineers, the Third Circuit elu-
cidated the difference between the precise issue of Locomotive Engineers
and that of the instant case.' 0 5 Both cases decided whether the filing of
a petition for reconsideration renders a prior agency action non-final.'((;
Locomotive Engineers, however, considered the question for the purpose of
determining when the time limit for appeal expires, while [Vest Penn ad-
dressed the same question in deciding whether an appellate court has
99. See Northside, 804 F.2d at 378-79 (allowing simultaneous jurisdiction);
American Trucking Ass'ns v. SCC, 697 F.2d 1146, 1148 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(same). For the facts of Northside and American Trucking, see supra notes 38 and
39, respectively.
100. See Comment, supra note 84, at 537 ("[U]nder a plain meaning inter-
pretation of [§ 704] . . . the litigant could file for judicial review even while he
seeks relief from the agency.").
101. 482 U.S. 270 (1987). For a discussion of Locomotive Engineers, see supra
notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
102. See Locomotive Engrs, 482 U.S. at 284-85; [Vest Penn, 860 F.2d at 587-88.
103. [Vest Penn, 860 F.2d at 585.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 284-85; [West Penn, 860 F.2d at 585.
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jurisdiction over a petition for review.1" 7
When a litigant files for reconsideration of an otherwise final agency
order, the prior agency action may become non-final. This question of
finality is potentially significant in two contexts. The outcome of the
finality issue determines whether a time limit for appeal is stayed and
whether an appellate court has jurisdiction.
In West Penn, the Third Circuit considered whether finality should
be defined the same in both contexts or could have incongruent defini-
tions.'10  There are four possible resolutions of the finality issue when a
party files a petition for reconsideration. First, the agency action could
be final for both purposes. The limitations period would not be stayed
and judicial review would be available. 10 9 Second, the agency action
could be non-final in both contexts. The time limit for appeal would be
tolled and judicial review would be premature." 0 Third, the agency ac-
tion could be final in that the time limit for appeal is running and yet
non-final insofar as judicial review is unavailable.I l Finally, the agency
action might be non-final so that the limitations period is stayed and
final to allow appellate jurisdiction.' 12
It is submitted that the most equitable and efficient outcomes will
result when section 704 operates such that the two concepts of finality
are applied congruently. In other words, when an action is "final," the
time limit for appeals is running and the litigant should have the oppor-
tunity to appeal to a federal court.' 13 When an action is "non-final," the
appellate court has no jurisdiction and the time limit for appeals should
be stayed.' 14 A party should never face a situation in which the time
107. See Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 284 (issue is whether "the pendency
of reconsideration motions . . . render[s] Commission orders nonfinal for pur-
poses of triggering the ... limitations period"); West Penn, 860 F.2d at 585 (issue
is whether agency action is final in terms of appellate court jurisdiction despite
pendency of reconsideration petition).
108. See West Penn, 860 F.2d at 585 ("In analytic terms, the question is
whether we can hold that an agency decision is non-final for purposes of the
timing of a Petition for Review but final in terms of conferring jurisdiction upon
the appellate court.").
109. See Comment, supra note 84, at 536 (suggesting that this was implicitly
the law of Ninth Circuit after Consolidated Flower Shipments v. CAB, 205 F.2d
499 (9th Cir. 1953)).
110. This is the West Penn result. See West Penn, 860 F.2d at 587-88.
111. Under this option, the litigant might be forced to abandon the recon-
sideration request or relinquish the chance for judicial review. For additional
discussion of this option, see supra notes 95-98, infra note 115, and accompany-
ing text.
112. This option was rejected in Wl'est Penn. See West Pein, 860 F.2d at 587-
88. For additional discussion of this option, see infra notes 120-22 and accom-
panying text.
113. The West Penn court seems to assume that this is the ultimate result of
its holding. See supra note 62.
114. Were this a well-established rule of administrative procedure, the fac-
tual situation in Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d 371 (7th
15
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limit for appeals is running and yet the appellate court has no jurisdic-
tion.1 15 Similarly, no party should be able to enjoy judicial review while
the time limit for appeal is stayed. 1 16
This congruence is assured under the system outlined by West Penn.
The Supreme Court in Locomotive Engineers held that a timely filed recon-
sideration petition renders the prior agency action non-final for pur-
poses of the limitations period. 1' 7 The Third Circuit in West Penn
rejected the argument that finality should be defined differently for pur-
poses of appellate jurisdiction and the running of the limitations pe-
riod.' 18 Therefore, the Third Circuit reached a logical conclusion in
Cir. 1986), might have evolved in a different manner. For the facts of Northside,
see supra note 38. The court in Northside held that the pendency of a reconsider-
ation petition does not defeat appellate jurisdiction. Northside, 804 F.2d at 379.
If the court had held instead that such simultaneous jurisdiction was impermissi-
ble, it would have dismissed Northside's petition for review as premature.
Northside, however, would have been secure in the knowledge that the time
limit for appeal of the order was stayed until the agency acted upon the recon-
sideration petition. Therefore, there would have been no incentive to file a pro-
tective appeal on the day before the time limit for appeal elapsed.
115. This might have been the case in Consolidated Flower Shipments, Inc.
v. CAB, 205 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1953), had the appellant filed for judicial revie.
while the reconsideration petition was still pending. The Consolidated Flower
court held that the filing of a timely reconsideration petition does not stay the
time limit for appeal. Id. at 450. If the petition forjudicial review had been filed
within the statutory time limit and while the reconsideration petition was still
pending, then the court would have had to decide whether such simultaneous
jurisdiction was permissible. If the court then held that petitioner could not
appeal to the court and the agency at the same time, and the agency had not yet
ruled on the reconsideration petition as the time limit for appeal approached,
the appellant would have had to abandon the agency proceeding or lose all op-
portunity forjudicial review. This is one example of an incongruent application
of "finality." This scheme cuts rather harshly against petitioners, who would
face the running of the time limit and yet be unable to seek judicial review. For
the facts of Consolidated Flower, see supra note 97.
116. There are no cases on this point, perhaps because petitioners awaiting
the outcome of agency reconsideration reflexively file protective appeals when
the time limit for judicial review approaches. If West Penn, for instance, had
filed its petition for review more than 60 days after EPA denied Pennsylvania's
reclassification request, the court, in accord with its actual holding, woild have
found the appeal timely because the filing of the reconsideration petition ren-
dered the prior agency order non-final and tolled the time limit for appeal. For
purposes of illustration, suppose the court also permitted simultaneous jurisdic-
tion in that instance. West Penn would have enjoyed judicial review while the
time limit for appeals was stayed. This would be another example of an incon-
gruent application of the two concepts of finality, and the petitioner would enjoy
both the benefit of the tolling of the time limit and the availability of judicial
review. For the facts germane to the jurisdictional issue in W est Penn,, see snpra
notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
117. See Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 284-85.
118. See Vest Penn, 860 F.2d at 587-88. But see CAB v. Delta Air Lines, 367
U.S. 316, 326-27 (1961) (questions of administrative finality do not present
same problems, or deserve same solutions, as questions concerning timeliness
of appeal).
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holding that the filing of a timely reconsideration petition renders an
otherwise final agency action non-final in both contexts.I ' The only
other option available to the West Penn court that would not have con-
flicted with Locomotive Engineers represented an incongruent application
of finality. An otherwise final agency action could remain final, strictly
for purposes of judicial review, despite the pendency of a timely filed
reconsideration petition. 120 A party would have no incentive to file a
protective appeal, because Locomotive Engineers assured litigants that a
pendent reconsideration petition tolls the running of the limitations pe-
riod. However, this "simultaneous jurisdiction" option presents the
same "obvious potential for duplication or wasted effort" as a bona fide
protective appeal,' 2 ' without offering any significant countervailing
benefit to the petitioner, which can bring its case to the court of appeals
after the agency disposes of the reconsideration petition.' 22
It is submitted that West Penn articulates a rational, consistent and
efficient plan of administrative procedure.' 2 3 The course prescribed by
119. The decision is logical in that it describes the only resolution of the
finality issue that both incorporates the holding of Locomotive Engineers and fos-
ters judicial efficiency. For additional discussion of the options available to the
IWVest Penn court, see supra notes 110 and 112 and accompanying text.
120. Neither the Seventh Circuit nor the District of Columbia Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of whether the filing of the reconsideration petition stayed the
time limit for appeal. See Northside Sanitary Landfill v. Thomas, 824 F.2d 371
(7th Cir. 1986); American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 697 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1983). This issue was moot because petitioners in both cases had petitioned for
judicial review within the statutorily prescribed time period. These pre-Locomo-
tive Engineers cases, therefore, do not stand for an incongruent application of
finality. For the facts of Northside and American Trucking, see supra notes 38 and
39, respectively.
121. West Penn, 860 F.2d at 586. See also New York v. United States, 568
F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing "deeply rooted policies of the federal courts
against piecemeal appeals and in favor of allowing administrative proceedings to
run their course without interference from the courts"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887
(1980); Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ("[W]hen the party
elects to seek a rehearing there is always a possibility that the order complained
of will be modified in a way which renders judicial review unnecessary.").
122. The West Penn court explains that the policy in favor of simultaneous
jurisdiction in the multi-party context is due to just such countervailing benefits,
namely concerns for efficiency and fairness to petitioners. See W Vest Penn, 860
F.2d at 587 (citing American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S.
532 (1970)). For a discussion of agency finality in the multi-party context, see
supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
123. A system under which an agency order is not rendered non-final upon
the filing of a reconsideration petition could also represent a congruent applica-
tion of the two concepts of finality. The agency order could be final for both the
purposes of the time limit for appeal (i.e., the time limit would be running) and
for purposes of appellate jurisdiction (i.e., judicial review would be available).
The thrust of the court's analysis in West Penn is that such an arrangement,
although in accord with the plain language of § 704, is a far inferior option in
terms of policy considerations. For a discussion of those considerations, see
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
In addition, this option represents the protective appeal problem resolved
17
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West Penn is supported by legislative history which indicates that Con-
gress never intended section 704 to change the prior practice that a final
agency action is rendered non-final when a party seeks a rehearing.12 4
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the problems of inefficiency and analytic incon-
sistency arose simply because, congressional intent notwithstanding,
section 704 does not acknowledge the possibility that a final agency ac-
tion may subsequently become non-final.' 25 Congress' failure to antici-
pate the potentially conflicting applications of the term "finality" led to
confusion and conflict among the courts of appeals.12 6 The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Locomotive Engineers, together with compelling
policy considerations, allowed the Third Circuit in West Penn to over-
come the plain meaning interpretation of section 704.127
Congress' avowed purpose in enacting section 704 could be accom-
plished in two ways. First, the section could be drafted in language that
embraces only the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
128
Second, Congress could add a provision to section 704 that adequately
circumscribes its impact when parties seek optional administrative reme-
dies.129 Until and unless section 704 is modified in some manner, the
West Penn decision represents the most comprehensive and workable in-
terpretation available.
Karen L. Pascale
by the Supreme Court in Locomotive Engineers. Because the agency order would
remain final in both contexts, petitioners would lose all opportunity for judicial
review unless they filed a timely, "protective" petition for judicial review. As
such, this application of administrative finality, although a congruent one, con-
flicts with the Supreme Court's holding in Locomotive Engineers which was con-
cerned with such protection appeals. See Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 284-85.
124. See generally Comment, supra note 84, at 534-35 (reviewing legislative
history of § 704 of APA). But see Kozinski, Hunt for Laws' "True" Meaning Subverts
Justice, Wall St. J.,Jan. 31, 1989, at A16, col. 3 (criticizing modern trend of rely-
ing on examination of legislative history to overcome plain meaning of statute).
125. For the text of § 704, see supra note 8.
126. For a discussion of the subsequent split among the circuit courts, see
supra note 94. See also Vining, supra note 79, at 1454 (suggesting that term "fi-
nal" has different meanings within § 704).
127. See West Penn, 860 F.2d at 587-88.
128. See, e.g., MODEL ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 4-218(1), 14 U.L.A. 134 (Supp.
1984). It provides in part: "The filing of [a petition for reconsideration] is not a
prerequisite for seeking . . .judicial review." Id.
129. An easy example of such qualifying language is found in Outland v.
CAB, 284 F.2d 224, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ("Where a motion for rehearing is in
fact filed there is no final action until the rehearing is denied.").
[Vol. 34: p. 517
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